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THE MISUSE OF PRODUCT MISUSE: VICTIM 
BLAMING AT ITS WORST 
ROBERT S. ADLER* 
ANDREW F. POPPER** 
ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the legal consequences that surface 
when a consumer uses a product in a manner not specifically in-
tended by that product's designer or manufacturer. If a product is 
used in a reasonably foreseeable manner, the fact that the use is at 
odds with a manufacturer’s intention should not be a basis to deny 
tort liability or limit the regulatory options of the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission.  If a product proves to be unsafe, defective, 
dangerous, or otherwise hazardous to users and consumers, use 
patterns should not be the primary determinant in assessing reg-
ulatory and common law sanctions or consequences.  While pro-
ducers may wish to limit tort liability or regulatory impact by 
characterizing as wrongful all uses not fully consistent with spec-
ified instructions, limiting tort liability or regulatory impact is in-
defensible, inhumane, and at odds with common law tort princi-
ples and the clear purposes of the Consumer Product Safety Act. 
Penalizing consumers for uses that are reasonable but not ex-
pressly intended is little more than victim blaming.  A legal culture 
that scapegoats consumers is justly seen as pathological regulatory 
capture.  Ramped up consumer misuse standards reward those 
who create risks and punish those who are harmed.  That cannot 
possibly be the goal of the common law or the legacy anticipated 
when the Consumer Product Safety Commission was formed 
nearly a half-century ago. 
* Commissioner, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.
** Bronfman Professor of Law and Government, American University Wash-
ington College of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 50-50-90 rule: anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting 
something right, there’s a 90 [percent] probability you’ll get it 
wrong. 
―Andy Rooney, 60 Minutes1 
Even monkeys fall from trees. 
―Chris Bradford, The Ring of Earth2 
Everyone makes mistakes,3 which means that all of us, as 
consumers, will undoubtedly be guilty of misusing products at 
some time in our lives. Fortunately, most of our mistakes will re-
sult in inconvenience and embarrassment rather than broken 
bones or worse. However, there are times when a slight loss of 
1 Andy Rooney Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, 
https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/andy_rooney_194055 
[https://perma.cc/WW9M-CS5Y]. 
2 CHRIS BRADFORD, YOUNG SAMURAI: THE RING OF EARTH 200 (2010). 
3 There is a large body of literature on how and why we make mistakes, 
most predicated on the fact that being hard-wired as humans makes it inevi-
table that we will err. See e.g., JOSEPH T. HALLINAN, WHY WE MAKE MISTAKES: 
HOW WE LOOK WITHOUT SEEING, FORGET THINGS IN SECONDS, AND ARE ALL 
PRETTY SURE WE ARE WAY ABOVE AVERAGE 2–3 (2009) (studying human error 
and scientific reasons why it exists through real-life stories); Olga Khazan, 
Why Mistakes Are Often Repeated, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/02/why-mistakes-are-often-
repeated/470778/ [http://perma.cc/Y28T-PM4D] (discussing neurological rea-
sons why failure to learn from past mistakes causes people to repeatedly make 
the same mistakes); Sophie Morris, Oops, We Did it Again—Why We Make Mis-
takes, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/artsenter-
tainment/books/features/oops-we-did-it-again-why-we-make-mistakes-
1645571.html [http://perma.cc/5A4C-SCFZ] (looking at ways to avoid the sim-
ple errors humans inevitably make every day); Why Clever People Make More 
Mistakes Than Most, BBC CAPITAL (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/capi-
tal/story/20151119-why-clever-people-make-more-stupid-mistakes-than-eve-
ryone-else [http://perma.cc/A58X-PPU4] (distinguishing intelligence from ra-
tional thinking and reasoning that the most successful people often make 
mistakes others do not because of certain personality traits); Why Making Mis-
takes Is What Makes Us Human, KQED (Sept. 2, 2015), 
https://ww2.kqed.org/mindshift/2015/09/02/making-mistakes-is-what-makes-
us-human/ [http://perma.cc/S4WJ-6TLR] (describing Kathryn Shultz’s TED 
Talk on seeing the value in being wrong).  
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attention, a distraction, or a failure to heed warnings or follow 
instructions can mean disaster. 
No rational actor seeks injury—but there are times when 
product misuse (mistakes in attentiveness, care, or judgment in 
the use of a product) results in the loss of life or limb.4 No one is 
perfect. Stated another way, the one thing that is inevitable is 
that we will err. Those who work in the field of product safety 
know this and, accordingly, strive to articulate, implement, and 
enforce appropriate standards and measures to prevent tragedies 
that arise from product misuse before those harms occur.5 
Product misuse has commanded the attention of various 
observers, commentators, and policymakers over the years.6 The 
debate has revolved around the extent to which a health and 
safety agency like the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) should regulate when consumers have been injured or 
killed using products in ways not intended or sanctioned by man-
ufacturers, but in ways readily foreseeable.7 
When consumers are injured through misuse of a product, 
the regulatory approach and the common law model follow two 
different policy paths.8 In a product liability action, the conven-
tional approach for the last three decades has been to limit9 or 
4 See Robert Adler, Redesigning People Versus Redesigning Products: The 
Consumer Product Safety Commission Addresses Product Misuse, 11 J.L. & 
POL’Y 79, 79 (1995). 
5 See id. at 80. 
6 “Product misuse” has been defined in many different ways. At the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), it ranges from the involuntary or 
unknowing departure from manufacturer’s instructions to deliberate risk tak-
ing in contravention of known safety norms. The policy implications of product 
misuse have been around as long as health and safety regulation has existed. 
As long-time observers of CPSC, we have focused our comments on the issue 
at CPSC. However, this discussion is applicable to other health and safety 
agencies like FDA, OSHA, and EPA. It is a topic that Commissioner Adler first 
explored almost a quarter century ago. See id. at 81. Sadly, from our perspec-
tive, it is an issue that never goes away. 
7 See id. at 81, 86. 
8 See id. at 80. 
9 See Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001) (af-
firming lower court’s reduction of damages based on misuse of sauna equip-
ment making the user thirty-five percent negligent); See generally Randy 
Koenders, Products Liability: Product Misuse Defense, 65 A.L.R.4TH 263, 270–
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deny10 recovery if the cause of an injury is the unforeseeable mis-
use11 of that product. A foreseeable, but unreasonable use, in con-
trast, does not necessarily cut off liability: “Unforeseeable” and 
“unreasonable” are not synonyms.12 “Therefore, unreasonable 
misuse is not a defense to a strict liability defective product 
claim.”13 Thus, an unreasonable use may well be a reasonably 
foreseeable misuse and does not necessarily bar liability.14 
The factors in play regarding the debate between unrea-
sonable use and unforeseeable misuse are part of the tort reform 
84 (1988) (discussing misuse as a defense generally and how individual states 
approach the product misuse defense). 
10 A complete denial of recovery occurs in those states that apply contribu-
tory negligence to cases. A reduction of damages occurs where states apply 
comparative negligence to cases. Most states today follow the latter approach. 
See e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Garrett Cty. v. Bell Atl., 695 A.2d 171, 181 (Md. 
1997); John Cowley & Bros., Inc. v. Brown, 569 So.2d 375, 376 (Ala. 1990); 
Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 268 S.E.2d 504, 504 (N.C. 1980); Wingfield v. 
Peoples Drug Store Inc., 379 A.2d 685, 687 (D.C. 1977); Basket v. Banks, 45 
S.E.2d 173, 177 (Va. 1947); Comparative & Contributory Negligence, JUSTIA, 
https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/comparative-contributory-
negligence/ [http://perma.cc/7K6C-KDSX] (stating that Alabama, Maryland, 
North Carolina, Virginia and Washington, D.C. are the only jurisdictions that 
still apply pure contributory negligence, which bars a plaintiff from recovering 
if he or she acted negligently and contributed to the accident in any way); see 
also William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1953) 
(explaining the origin of the comparative negligence doctrine). 
11 In this Paper, we distinguish between unforeseeable misuse of a product, 
a common bar to tort liability, and unreasonable uses that reflect a lack of due 
care but are foreseeable that are not necessarily a bar, e.g., using a power lawn 
mower to trim tall weeds or low-lying brush, are not intended uses from a man-
ufacturer’s perspective, but are foreseeable. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LAW 890–91 (2d ed. 2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. 
LIAB. § 2 cmt. at p (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (endorsing the “unforeseeable misuse” 
standard). 
12 See Cigna Ins. Co., 241 F.3d at 16–18. 
13 See Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 470, 476 (1991). 
14 Asay v. Kolberg-Pioneer, No. 2:08-CV-01242-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 
32390006 (D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2010) (stating that “[a] plaintiff’s misuse of a prod-
uct, which is not reasonably foreseeable, is ... a defense to strict products lia-
bility,” and citing Crown Controls Corp. v. Corella, 98 Nev. 35, 37 (1982) (per 
curiam) which goes on to hold that “use of a product that the manufacturer 
should reasonably anticipate is not misuse or abuse.”). 
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discourse.15 They involve the potential of significant money dam-
ages and broader questions underlying strict liability in tort.16 
They are more focused on remedy for an injured person than on 
the broader public safety goals extant in the regulatory domain.17 
Unlike the common law model, Congress and federal agen-
cies have generally adopted a broader approach in the regulatory 
product safety context.18 Here, the legislature has directed agen-
cies like CPSC to protect even careless consumers from dangerous 
products so long as the protective measures do not unduly raise 
the price or affect the utility of a product.19 This is made clear in 
the Consumer Product Safety Act where the agency is directed to 
make specific findings about the impact of a rule on a product’s 
utility, cost, or availability, but is fully authorized to act in in-
stances where consumer misuse is likely or present.20 The theory 
is that dangerous products that can be rendered safe at minimal 
cost should be made so even when consumers do not act as man-
ufacturers intend.21 As a humane society, we want to reduce un-
necessary pain and suffering especially when the cost of doing so 
15 See ANDREW F. POPPER, MATERIALS ON TORT REFORM 16 (2d ed. 2017). 
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A ch. 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
17 See id. 
18 See Adler, supra note 4, at 80. 
19 Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–89 (2012); see Guide 51: 
Safety aspects—Guidelines for their inclusion in standards, INT’L ORG. 
STANDARDIZATION & INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N i, v (Jan. 3, 2014) [here-
inafter ISO Safety Guidelines] (making recommendations for how to draft 
safety standards in compliance with international requirements and stand-
ards). 
20 § 2058(f)(1) (“Prior to promulgating a consumer product safety rule, the 
Commission shall consider, and make appropriate findings for inclusion for 
such rule with respect to … the need of the public for the consumer products 
subject to such rule, and the probable effect of such rule upon the utility, cost, 
or availability of such products to meet such need.”). 
21 While the primary focus of this Paper is on the CPSC and the regulatory 
environment, the question posed regarding the baseline standard for assessing 
the use of a product by a consumer (intended use vs. reasonably foreseeable 
use) is also one of the core issues in the tort reform discourse as it pertains to 
tort liability in the civil justice system. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (AM. LAW. INST. 1998) (attempting to limit liability to 
intended uses rather than reasonably foreseeable uses); ANDREW F. POPPER, 
MATERIALS ON TORT REFORM 16 (2d ed. 2017) (identifying this topic as a tort 
reform issue); Martin A. Kotler, The Myth of Individualism and the Appeal of 
2018] MISUSE OF PRODUCT MISUSE 7 
is reasonable. Moreover, despite the temptation to invoke moral 
judgments about product misuse (“they deserve what they got”) 
or to insist that harsh treatment of those who blunder will con-
vince consumers to take greater care (“teach them a lesson they 
won’t soon forget”), a significant body of research demonstrates 
that “most accidents are truly accidents, not the result of gambles 
that turn out badly.”22 What is termed “misuse” by producers of-
ten turns out not to be blatant risk-taking or mindless careless-
ness, but instead is predictable and utterly human behavior such 
as forgetfulness, lack of knowledge, momentary losses of concen-
tration, impulsiveness, or unforeseen distractions.23 
Quite simply, while the doctrine of unforeseeable misuse 
can play a definitive role in certain product liability cases, it is of 
little or no consequence in the regulatory context where the pri-
mary focus must be on the product itself and not on the misuse of 
the  product by a consumer.24 This in no way diminishes the com-
plementary role tort law plays in the quest for safer products.  
Tort liability can and does achieve the dual goals of per-
sonal remedy and deterrence, sending a powerful and cautionary 
message to producers of the same or similar products.25 For prod-
uct users, as opposed to producers, tort law embodies a very dif-
ferent type of deterrence by limiting civil liability in those in-
stances where a consumer’s misuse of a product is “so highly 
Tort Reform, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 779, 823 (2007) (mentioning the misuse vs. 
reasonably foreseeable use debate). 
22 Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1200 (1994). According to Professor Latin’s research, 
“[m]ost accidents are truly accidents, not the result of deliberate gambles that 
turn out badly.” Id. A court may assume that serious injury due to failure to 
read warnings was due to “unusually careless or deliberately risky behavior,” 
but in reality, there are avoidable and reasonable explanations for why warn-
ings—even good warnings—are not being read. Id. at 1207. 
23 See Michael S. Wogalter et al., Risk Perception of Common Consumer 
Products: Judgments of Accident Frequency and Precautionary Intent, 24 J. 
SAFETY RES. 97, 100 (1993) (reporting that individuals overestimate low-prob-
ability product risks and underestimate high-probability product risks). 
24 Adler, supra note 4, at 115. 
25 Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 191 
(2012). 
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extraordinary as to be unforeseeable ….”26 In such cases, unfore-
seeable misuse can be considered a “superseding cause” and lim-
its or cuts off the defendant’s liability.27 
The Mississippi Supreme Court noted recently: “[I]f the 
end user could always recover damages from a manufacturer, re-
gardless of the misuse of the product, customers, beyond concerns 
of self-preservation … would have little incentive to ensure they 
used the product properly.”28 The tort doctrine of unforeseeable 
misuse, “promotes the social goal of both manufacturers and cus-
tomers exercising due care.”29 However, that unforeseeable mis-
use of a product can limit or bar tort liability in the civil justice 
system is entirely separate from the regulatory goals of product 
safety at the CPSC.30 
Merely because a consumer unforeseeably misuses a prod-
uct and by doing so is unable to succeed in a cause of action in tort 
is  often unrelated to the question of whether a product is un-
safe.31 Consider that this limitation on recovery is in play when 
the consumer’s “unforeseeable misuse of the product substan-
tially change[s] the condition of the product, and that change, and 
not the alleged defect, is the proximate cause of the alleged injury 
….”32 
 From a broader perspective: the safety of consumer goods 
is an inarguable public interest.  If a product is unsafe because of 
its design, manufacture, or lack of an appropriate warning, the 
way in which one person used—or misused—or unforeseeably 
misused—the product is rarely relevant. It is the product itself, 
not the coincidental misuse that must be the focus of agency ac-
tion. We strongly disagree with those who would bar a health and 
safety agency like CPSC from protecting consumers where misuse 
has played a part in a product’s risk. Our reason is clear: Were 
CPSC and other agencies limited to instances in which injuries, 
26 Perez v. VAS S.p.A., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590, 607 (Ct. App. 2010); see Mine 
Safety Appliance Co. v. Holmes, 171 So. 3d 442, 454 (Miss. 2015). 
27 Mine Safety Appliance Co., 171 So. 3d at 454; Perez, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 
607–08. 
28 Mine Safety Appliance Co., 171 So. 3d at 454. 
29 Id. 
30 See id.  
31 See id. 
32 Id. 
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illness, or death occurred only during the “proper” or “intended” 
use of a product, many of the agency’s rules and regulations would 
be rendered invalid, exposing consumers to great danger from 
hazardous products.33 
For example, most ingestions of poisons and toxic chemi-
cals that the Poison Prevention Packaging Act34 guards against 
occur because caregivers inappropriately leave such products free 
for  children to access.35 Similarly, the ghastly fire injuries and 
fatalities from flammable fabrics that have triggered CPSC safety 
rules typically result from careless smokers or from unsupervised 
children playing with matches or lighters.36 Furthermore, CPSC 
can and does take action to address injuries from products like 
lawn mowers that result from consumers’ risky—but completely 
predictable—actions, such as putting their hands under the hous-
ing of a mower to clear debris.37 
In these and similar instances, the Commission has tradi-
tionally adopted Congress’s basic notion that it is far easier to re-
design hazardous products than to reconfigure careless consum-
ers. Of course, as with any broad policy, there are limits. Where 
33 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1120.3(b)(1) (2015) (categorizing children’s upper 
outerwear with one or more drawstrings as “substantial product hazards”); 16 
C.F.R. § 1511.7 (1977) (“[P]acifiers shall be labelled with the statement: “Warn-
ing—Do Not Tie Pacifier Around Child’s Neck as it Presents a Strangulation
Danger.”); 16 C.F.R. § 1500.83(a)(38)(iv) (2010) (requiring writing instruments
containing more than three grams of ink to be labeled as “toxic.”).
34 Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471–75, § 1471 
(2012). 
35 See Eileen M. McDonald et al., Primary Care Opportunities to Prevent 
Unintentional Home Injuries: A Focus on Children and Older Adults, 12 AM. J. 
LIFESTYLE MED. 96, 97 (2018) (urging primary care doctors to play a more cen-
tral role in patient safety to prevent unintentional home injuries). 
36 See 16 C.F.R. § 1602.1(a)–(e) (2012) (Flammable Fabrics Act); see also 
Upholstered Furniture, Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 114, 30735 (June 15, 1994) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1640) (proposing 
a flammability standard for furniture fabrics associated with fires due to small 
open flames, such as cigarettes). 
37 See 16 C.F.R. § 1205.5(a) (implementing blade control systems and a 
blade stopping test for walk-behind power mowers); Lawn Mower Safety, U. S. 
CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N (June 4, 1987), https://www.cpsc.gov/con-
tent/lawn-mower-safety [http://perma.cc/ZG5D-GSUM] (discussing how new 
safety features on mowers will reduce accidents like injury from contact with 
the blade). 
10 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:000 
consumer misbehavior is highly reckless and constitutes unfore-
seeable misuse, the kinds of precautions that companies should 
have to take to safeguard consumers would generally be beyond 
the duty of care to which a manufacturer should be held.38 
 One final point: the notion that protecting careless con-
sumers is generally futile because people will simply take more 
risks when products are made safer.39 The idea that people will 
blindly take calculated or even unreasonable chances—and that 
tendency explains the harms that befall them—is victim blam-
ing.40  
I. A BRIEF SNAPSHOT OF VICTIM BLAMING
It is neither within our professional expertise nor our pri-
mary purpose to delve deeply into the psychology of victim blam-
ing. Defenses in civil actions or explanations of seeming product 
failures predicated on consumer use, reasonably foreseeable mis-
use, and use that is at odds with the producer’s intentions, focus 
on and blame consumers for the harm they sustained.41 Contrib-
utory negligence and comparative fault (victim blaming doc-
trines) are central to understanding tort law and are predicated 
38 A good illustration of the distinction made can be found in a recent article, 
Lindsey Bever, Teens are daring each other to eat Tide Pods. We don’t need to 
tell you that’s a bad idea, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/01/13/teens-are-daring-each-other-
to-eat-tide-pods-we-dont-need-to-tell-you-thats-a-bad-idea/?noredi-
rect=on&utm_term=.7397b6834d72 [http://perma.cc/C964-53FG]. According 
to the article, a number of teenagers on social media have developed a fad of 
intentionally biting into brightly colored, highly toxic liquid laundry packets. 
In contrast, thousands of children under age five have innocently bitten into 
the packets believing them to be candy. Id. The latter group is the one that 
most deserves societal protection. 
39 This school of thought, often called Risk Compensation Theory (“RCT”) 
(or, sometimes, “moral hazard”), posits that safety measures are almost always 
offset by consumers taking more risks and, therefore, are useless and counter-
productive. Although occasionally persuasive, RCT has been increasingly de-
bunked as more evidence accumulates that safety measures have resulted in a 
“marked decline in injury deaths in most of the world over the last 50 years.” 
See Barry Pless, Risk Compensation: Revisited and Rebutted, 2 SAFETY 1, 6 
(2016). 
40 See id.  
41 See Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2001). 
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on the assumption that the actions (or inactions) of product users 
must be a central part of assessing civil liability.42 
There are many explanations for victim blaming. We will 
mention just two: (1) the hope of avoiding tort liability or regula-
tory sanction, and (2) the heartfelt need to trust the safety of the 
world around us.43 In assessing this aspect of our regulatory and 
civil justice systems, we have no difficulty assessing the liability 
avoidance rationale.44 The second rationale requires a brief expla-
nation. 
It is our observation that after learning of an unexpected 
and horrifying incident or accident, there seems to be an impulse 
(or even unstated hope) that somehow, the victim is at fault.45 
This may well emanate from an understandable need to distance 
oneself from hazard.46 
We think it self-evident that the closer we get to catastro-
phe, the more relatable and frightening catastrophe becomes. We 
neither sought verification nor believe it necessary to borrow from 
42 See Richard Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 791, 806 
(1990) (discussing victim blaming and other perils of tort law); Michael D. 
Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence: Superseding 
Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1103, 1104–105 (2002); 
Frank L. Maraist et al., Answering a Fool According to His Folly: Ruminations 
on Comparative Fault Thirty Years On, 70 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2010) (over-
view of comparative fault and “foolhardy” plaintiffs); William L. Prosser, Com-
parative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953) (on the jurisprudence of 
comparative fault and the challenge of addressing alleged misconduct of vic-
tims); David W. Robertson, Love and Fury: Recent Radical Revisions to the Law 
of Comparative Fault, 59 LA. L. REV. 175, 188 (1998) (advocating the use of 
comparative fault and not contributory negligence); Victor E. Schwartz & 
Christopher E. Appel, Two Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: Reconsidering the 
Application of Comparative Fault to Punitive Damage Awards, 78 MO. L. REV. 
133, 134–35 (2013) (nuanced discussion of comparative fault and punitive dam-
ages). 
43 See Popper, supra note 25, at 186, 190. 
44 See generally POPPER, supra note 15 (exploring the arguments of those 
who seek to limit or change civil liability and those who oppose those limita-
tions). 
45 Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and 
the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1393 (2003) (explana-
tions of unexpected harm are not always premised on fact: “We blame the fight 
on the bully, the accident on the klutz.”) 
46 See Popper, supra note 25, at 201. 
12 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:000 
other disciplines to support this observation. However, we did test 
the premise (admittedly unscientifically).47 For this exercise, we 
invented and then told our “subjects” (law students, law school 
administrators, and law faculty) two stories. Both stories started 
as follows: “Did you see that piece in the paper this morning about 
…?” 
The first story finished the sentence by describing a partic-
ularly violent crime and waiting to see the response. Over and 
over, we heard sympathy for the victim and a question about 
where the crime took place. Different answers regarding location 
produced different results—but consistently, when we said the 
crime occurred in some far-flung part of the city, the discussion 
would end within a minute or two. Once distanced from the 
threat, the incident became less frightening. 
The second story finished the sentence by describing a se-
vere and deadly product failure (we used both consumer goods 
and pharmaceuticals). Again, after sympathy, we heard a differ-
ent type of distancing. It came in the form of a suggestion from 
our subjects that something so unexpected may well have been 
the result of the user/victim not paying attention, not reading in-
structions, i.e., that the victim facilitated, invited, and was re-
sponsible for the catastrophe.48 Distancing and victim blaming49 
are benign fantasies50 that support the hope that we live in a 
47 We apologize to those social scientists and empiricists who find our meth-
ods unconvincing and primitive. We accept your criticism. We also believe that 
this insight is beyond question. 
48 Michael L. Rustad, Heart of Stone: What is Revealed About the Attitude 
of Compassionate Conservatives Towards Nursing Home Practices, Tort Re-
form, and Noneconomic Damages, 35 N.M. L. REV. 337, 360 (2005) (“Few 
themes resonate more with the American public than ‘blaming the victim.’”). 
49 Victim blaming is nothing particularly new. Mary J. Davis, Individual 
and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative Fault in Products 
Liability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281, 318 (1994) (tracing victim blaming back to an-
cient Rome: “Just as twentieth century defendants seek to blame the victim, 
the Romans commonly looked to the plaintiff’s conduct (or the conduct of the 
plaintiff’s slave) as a means of avoiding liability.” [footnote omitted]). 
50 That illusion can be shattered when something awful happens to a loved 
one who, in fact, was paying attention, attentive, doing everything “right”—
and yet, is a victim. While it may seem odd in an article of this nature, we share 
with you the following vignette. On January 11, 1982, Professor Popper’s oldest 
son, then just under the age of four, was in a supermarket with his mother 
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world where harm befalls those who fail to exercise due care, fail 
to protect themselves in ways that we, the “careful” people, would 
not let happen.51 We do not put these thoughts forward as an ex-
cuse for the general tendency to blame victims—but rather as an 
explanation of one force driving victim blaming at a personal 
level. After all, who wants to think we live in a world where the 
most innocent among us, for no reason whatsoever, can suddenly 
fall victim to something so terrifying and inexplicable?52 This may 
explain why our civil justice system—tort law generally and par-
ticularly product liability law—tilts in favor of victim blaming.53 
To be clear, our premise is not that people who are harmed 
are universally and uniformly faultless. There are instances 
where people misuse products or use products in ways that are 
not just unforeseeable but are at odds with common sense, times 
when people assume risks and contribute to their own harm(s).54 
when, without warning, a vending machine fell on him and nearly killed him. 
It was a freak accident—terrifying at every level. After extensive analysis, it 
turned out that the actual cause of the accident was faulty design of the ma-
chine—but for months—and even still today—whenever that unthinkable and 
life-changing event came up, people first asked, “What was he doing? Maybe 
he was pulling on the machine? Climbing on it?” 
51 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Essay: A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine 
Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1767–68 (2014) (“We prefer to believe that things 
happen for a reason, and thus that victims of harms deserve their fate …. [This] 
may help explain how jurors determine causation in torts cases.” [footnote 
omitted]). 
52 Incidents of sexual assault can bring out one of the most disturbing and 
infuriating sides of this response set—blaming the victim of the assault. 
Dripps, supra note 45, at 1389 (“In rape cases, the jury may be encouraged to 
blame the victim for sexual activity. This may very well translate into an irra-
tional inference of consent from the victim’s character.”); Kristen M. Klein et 
al., Attributions of Blame and Responsibility in Sexual Harassment: Reexam-
ining a Psychological Model, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 92, 94 (2011). 
53 David G. Owen, Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2000) (regarding consumer responsibility for harm: “When a person 
is injured while using a product, the accident may be attributable to some de-
fect in the product. But even if a product is defective in some respect, most 
product accidents are caused more by the consumer’s risky behavior in using 
the product than by the product’s defective condition.”). 
54 Barring a plaintiff who contributes to his or her harm has been part of 
the tort law discourse for centuries. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 
(K.B. 1809) (holding one who causes harm to themselves cannot recover in 
tort). 
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Our premise, however, is that such incidents are not the norm. 
Our concern is that ramped up regulatory standards for product 
misuse envision a world of reckless actors, a world at odds with 
reality.55 
Victim blaming on an institutional level, however, has an 
entirely different rationale. Institutional or corporate victim 
blaming is a very profitable strategy.56 When successful, victim 
blaming capitalizes on the aforementioned human tendencies and 
allows those who cause harm to avoid the cost of accountability.57 
However, in the regulatory domain, where compensatory and pu-
nitive damages are not in play and the only real question is the 
safety of the products that surround us, the same constructs re-
garding victim blaming should not be relevant. Whether the user 
of a product exercised optimal care, ordinary care, or less than 
optimal care should not bar effective remedial actions. 
How someone may have used, misused, or unreasonably 
misused a product in the past should play little role in determin-
ing whether that product is sufficiently dangerous to merit CPSC 
action.58 At CPSC, the focus should be on the safety and utility of 
the product, taking into account all reasonably foreseeable uses—
and nothing more.  
II. REASONABLY FORESEEABLE MISUSE AND CPSC’S STATUTORY
MANDATES 
CPSC enforces a number of acts in addition to the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, including the Federal Hazardous Sub-
stances Act,59 the Flammable Fabrics Act,60 the Poison Preven-
tion Packaging Act,61 and the Refrigerator Safety Act.62 Although 
these acts use somewhat different language in defining their 
55 See, e.g., infra notes 145–149 and accompanying text. 
56 Rustad, supra note 48, at 360 (“‘Victim’s talk’ in the tort arena is used ... 
to disavow responsibility for defective products, bad medicine, and unsafe prac-
tices ....”). 
57 Id. 
58 Adler, supra note 4, at 85.  
59 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261–78 (2012). 
60 Id. §§ 1191–1204. 
61 Id. §§ 1471–77. 
62 Id. §§ 1211–14. 
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scope, we believe it to be beyond question that all provide the au-
thority and responsibility for these agencies to act in instances of 
reasonably foreseeable product misuse.63 Here is a brief sum-
mary: 
Consumer Product Safety Act: In 1968, Congress estab-
lished a study commission, the National Commission on Product 
Safety (NCPS), to determine whether the nation’s consumer prod-
uct safety protections were sufficient to safeguard the public from 
unreasonable risks of injury.64 NCPS found that an independent 
safety agency dedicated to addressing consumer products was es-
sential.65 Congress largely followed NCPS’s blueprint for such an 
agency two years later when it enacted the Consumer Product 
Safety Act.66 
Without question, the NCPS called for the new agency to 
have the authority to act in cases of product misuse so long as 
manufacturers could reasonably have foreseen such misuse: “the 
manufacturer or seller ought not be absolved merely because the 
consumer used the product in a manner different from that in-
tended. A manufacturer should be responsible for injury to con-
sumers from use or certain types of misuse which could reasona-
bly have been anticipated.”67 
63 See ISO Safety Guidelines, supra note 19, at 2 (defining “reasonably fore-
seeable misuse” as “use of a product or system in a way not intended by the 
supplier, but which can result from readily predictable human behaviour”). 
The Guidelines further provide that “[r]eadily predictable human behaviour” 
is meant to include all users including “the elderly, children and persons with 
disabilities.” See also infra notes 135–140. 
64 See S.J. Res. 33, Joint resolution to establish a National Commission on 
Product Safety, Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466–67 (1967). 
65 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 5 (1970) 
[hereinafter NCPS]. 
66 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2053–54 (2012). 
67 NCPS, supra note 65, at 75. The Report further stated, “[m]anufacturers 
must take all practical steps systematically to prevent foreseeable misuse of 
products.” Id. at 62. See generally BRUCE K. MULOCK, CONGRESSIONAL 
RESEARCH SERVICE, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION: CPSIA 
IMPLEMENTATION (2009), https://www.everycrsreport.com/re-
ports/RS22821.html [http://perma.cc/9JTV-JZQ4]. 
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Consistent with this theme, Congress made clear its inten-
tion that the agency be authorized to act in instances of reasona-
bly foreseeable product misuse.68 As Senator Frank Moss, one of 
the key architects of the CPSA, stated: 
It is ... my hope that [the courts] will take notice of the fact that 
the word “associated” was chosen so as to convey the fact that 
the risk of injury did not have to result from “normal use” of 
the consumer product but could also result from such things as 
“exposure to or reasonable foreseeable misuse of the consumer 
product.”69 
We note that the Senate version of the Act included a defi-
nition of the term “use,” which explicitly included a reference to 
“reasonably foreseeable misuse.”70 The House-Senate Conference 
Committee that met to work out the differences between the two 
bodies, however, adopted the House version of the Act, which did 
not contain this language.71 
One might ask whether this means that Congress rejected 
the Senate’s version that consumer misuse be included in the 
agency’s authority. The answer is clearly, no. Such an interpreta-
tion would misread the dynamic between the two houses in work-
ing out their statutory differences. What actually happened was 
that the Senate broadly conceded to the House on most provisions 
of the Act because the Senate would have placed regulatory au-
thority over almost all consumer products in the new agency: a 
proposition to which the House strongly objected.72 No profound—
68 The definition of the word “use” in the Senate Report accompanying the 
CPSA confirms this proposition: “The definition of ‘use’ includes exposure to 
and any normal use. In addition, it includes reasonably foreseeable misuse. 
The ambit of risk, then, extends beyond exposure and normal use to those risks 
presented by consumer products being misused if such misuse is ‘reasonably 
foreseeable.’” S. REP. NO. 92-749, at 15 (1972). 
69 118 CONG. REC. 36197, 36198 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1972) (statement of Sen. 
Moss).  
70 S. REP. NO. 92-749, at 15 (1972). 
71 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1593 (1972). Although the House bill did not specif-
ically define “unreasonable hazard” (which was selected to serve as the term 
analogous to the Senate’s “unreasonable risk”), it did define “hazard” as “sub-
stantial risk of injury.” Id. at 16–17. 
72 See BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT: 
TEXT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 32 (1973) (“It is general practice with 
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or even minor—disagreement over the role of consumer misuse 
was ever raised or discussed between the two bodies.73 
Moreover, if Congress had wished to exclude consumer 
misuse from CPSC jurisdiction, one wonders why it did not do so 
in a much more explicit fashion given how expansive the legisla-
ture had been in extending the scope of the other acts enforced by 
the agency to include product misuse.74 
Finally, if there were any lingering doubts about the au-
thority of the agency to protect consumers injured through rea-
sonably foreseeable product misuse, they were put to rest in 
Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission.75 
In that case, a lawn mower manufacturer argued that CPSC could 
not regulate its product because consumers assumed the risk of 
injury.76 The U.S. Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting 
that neither consumer misuse nor assumption of risk limited 
CPSC’s regulatory authority: 
Congress intended for injuries resulting from foreseeable mis-
use of a product to be counted in assessing risk …. This princi-
ple, and not the tort liability concept of “assumption of risk,” 
governs the Commission’s authority to treat consumers’ fore-
seeable action of removing safety shields as creating an unrea-
sonable risk of injury and to issue rules addressing that dan-
ger.77  
Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA): The language 
and legislative history of the FHSA similarly make clear that 
Congress intended the Act to extend to instances of foreseeable 
congressional conferences for each side to give up something in order to gain 
approval of something else, but with the consumer product safety bill, the Sen-
ate came out with very little of its bill intact. The major hurdle for House ac-
ceptance was the Senate’s inclusion of broad regulatory authority over almost 
all consumer products, including food, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, and 
veterinary medicine.”). 
73 Id.  
74 See supra notes 15–38 and accompanying text. 
75 Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 619 F.2d 499, 
499 (5th Cir. 1980). 
76 Id. at 503–04, 513 (challenging the regulation for going beyond its scope 
by including “nonconsumer products”). 
77 Id. at 513. 
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misuse.78 Specifically, in section 2(f)(1)(A), Congress defined a 
“hazardous substance” as including “injuries ... or ... illness dur-
ing or as a proximate result of any customary or reasonably fore-
seeable handling or use, including reasonably foreseeable inges-
tion by children.”79 
Even more telling: In 1966, Congress modified the FHSA 
to expand it from a purely labeling act to one that authorized 
standards and bans.80 In the 1969 amendments, Congress ex-
panded the definition of “hazardous substance” to include “toy[s] 
and other article[s] intended for use by children” if they present a 
mechanical, electrical, or thermal hazard.81 In doing so, Congress 
explicitly included reasonably foreseeable misuse as part of the 
Act’s jurisdiction.82 Consistent with the Act’s direction, the Com-
mission has long maintained a set of test methods for simulating 
use and abuse of toys and other articles intended for children to 
determine whether they present electrical, mechanical, or ther-
mal hazards.83 
Flammable Fabrics Act, Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 
and Refrigerator Safety Act: Briefly stated, the Flammable Fab-
rics Act authorizes the CPSC to establish flammability standards 
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(1)(A) (2012). 
79 Id. 
80 Technically, the 1966 amendments authorized only bans, but the distinc-
tion between standards and bans is semantic only, since most standards effec-
tively ban non-complying products and most bans prohibit only a subset of reg-
ulated products. 
81 Pub. L. No. 91-113, 83 Stat. 187, 187 (1969) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1261–74 (2012)).  
82 15 U.S.C. § 1261(r)–(t). As stated in the Senate Report: “Common to each 
of the definitions [of electrical, mechanical, and thermal hazards] is the phrase, 
‘in normal use or when subjected to reasonably foreseeable damage or abuse.’ 
The phrase places a significant duty upon the manufacturer of any toy or arti-
cle intended for use by children. Not only must he consider the safety of the 
product in normal use, he must also consider the safety of the article after 
damage or abuse—after predicting what the child using the toy will reasonably 
do to it or with it.” S. REP. NO. 237, at 6 (1969)  
83 16 C.F.R. §§ 1500.50–1500.53 (1975). Once a toy or article intended for 
use by children is subjected to the appropriate use and abuse test, the Com-
mission will then examine it to see whether it presents an electrical, mechani-
cal, or thermal hazard, and thus constitutes a banned hazardous toy. See id. § 
1500.18 (listing banned toys determined to present mechanical, electrical, or 
thermal hazards). 
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for furniture, sleepwear, general wearing apparel, and related 
materials “to protect the public against [the] unreasonable risk of 
the occurrence of fire leading to death or personal injury, or sig-
nificant property damage.”84 
“The Poison Prevention Packaging Act ... directs the CPSC 
to mandate ‘special packaging’ to protect children who might han-
dle or ingest dangerous household substances.”85 Typically, this 
means that the agency requires child resistant closures on prod-
ucts at a cost of pennies per container.86 
Finally, the Refrigerator Safety Act requires that refriger-
ator doors be easily opened from within to prevent child suffoca-
tions.87 This Act has proven to be one of the most successful pieces 
of safety regulation ever enacted virtually eliminating childhood 
fatalities while almost certainly reducing the cost of making re-
frigerators.88 
What is common among these statutes is that they are all 
strict liability laws, i.e., their requirements apply irrespective of 
proper or improper consumer use.89 In other words, a product 
84 15 U.S.C. § 1193(a). 
85 Adler, supra note 6, at 90. 
86 Requiring child-resistant packaging on over thirty household items has 
significantly decreased the number of child fatalities per year. Stefan Hell-
bardt et al., Packaging: Child-Resistant Features for Container Closure Sys-
tems, 18 DRUG DEV. & DELIVERY 57, 58 (2018), http://drug-dev.com/packaging-
child-resistant-features-for-container-closure-systems/ 
[https://perma.cc/S82G-N9FA]; see K.A. Mack et al., Preventing Unintentional 
Injuries in the Home Using the Health Impact Pyramid, 42(IS) HEALTH ED. & 
BEHAV. 115S, 119S (2015) (noting that “[s]tudies show clear declines in poison-
ings after the passing of the Poison Prevention Packaging Act (PPPA) in 1970” 
due to the Act requiring various household substances be securely packaged in 
child-resistant packaging) (further adding that data from the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC) showed that only forty-two fatal uninten-
tional poisonings were reported for children aged 0 to 4 years in 2012); see also 
Angie Qin, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Pediatric Poisoning Fatali-
ties from 1972 Through 2013, U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMMISSION 3 
(2016), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/PPPAMortality2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ZST-BVXB]. 
87 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211–14 (2012). 
88 Adler, supra note 6, at 90. 
89 See generally Coulter Boeschen, Strict Product Liability Laws, ALLLAW , 
http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/strict-product-liability-
laws.html [https://perma.cc/P5XB-UNZQ] (explaining that unlike proving fault 
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must comply with CPSC safety rules despite consumer misuse if 
it is to be sold to the public.90 In this regard, the regulatory and 
common law mandates regarding safety are indistinguishable.91 
If a consumer is injured or killed because of the product’s failure 
to comply with a CPSC rule, the manufacturer may be held liable 
in tort notwithstanding the consumer’s carelessness.92 
III. WHETHER PRODUCT MISUSE IS TREATED DIFFERENTLY IN
PRODUCT RECALLS THAN IN SAFETY STANDARDS 
Health and safety agencies encounter product misuse both 
in recalling products and in crafting safety standards.93 One 
might ask whether the two contexts call for different approaches, 
but such a notion finds no support either in law or in public pol-
icy.94 
in an ordinary injury case, “strict liability rules—like the one applied to strict 
products liability cases—does away with the analysis of whether the defend-
ant’s conduct met a certain standard.”). 
90 See id. 
91 In most jurisdictions, a failure to comply with a safety rule is considered 
per se negligence if a consumer is injured as a result of the manufacturer’s 
noncompliance. See, e.g., Kaltman v. All Am. Pest Control, 706 S.E.2d 864, 866 
(Va. Ct. App. 2011) (opining on whether the defendant’s use of a pesticide not 
approved for residential use on plaintiff’s home constituted negligence per se); 
Supreme Beef Packers, Inc., v. Maddox, 67 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2002) (alleging negligence per se for violations of the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act); Nettleton v. Thompson, 787 P.2d 294, 294 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990) 
(vacating and remanding case alleging negligence per se for a fall on an unsafe 
stairway in violation of building code standards); see also Negligence Per Se, 
JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/negligence-per-se/ 
[https://perma.cc/R3UB-WJCX]. 
92 See e.g., Nettleton, 787 P.2d at 294. 
93 See infra notes 108–114 and accompanying text. 
94 To be clear, we do not claim that the test for declaring a product to be a 
substantial product hazard is the same as finding that a product presents an 
unreasonable risk for purposes of promulgating a safety standard. In the for-
mer case, the Commission seeks to remove an otherwise legal product from the 
marketplace due to its particularly hazardous nature whereas a safety stand-
ard never touches products currently in inventory or in distribution. A “sub-
stantial product hazard” determination focuses almost exclusively on the risk 
of a product for which a recall is sought and imposes a higher standard of proof 
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To explain this point, we start with the obligation of firms 
under the Consumer Product Safety Act to report potentially dan-
gerous products to CPSC.95 One might hypothesize—unpersua-
sively to us—that consumer misuse should not trigger a reporting 
obligation under the Commission’s Substantial Product Hazard 
Reporting Rule because no defect would be present.96 The only 
time a firm would be obligated to report a potentially defective 
product to CPSC would be when a serious hazard arose from the 
“expected” or “proper” use of a product, i.e., when a consumer used 
a product in a manner recommended or approved by the manu-
facturer.97 In this interpretation, even if a consumer used a prod-
uct in a reasonably foreseeable manner, no reporting obligation 
would arise if the consumer did not follow the warnings and in-
structions for the product (i.e., the producer’s intention) or that 
the consumer otherwise “misused” the product.98 And, if a firm 
need not report a potential safety problem about a product to the 
agency, a fortiori, the firm would not need to recall it.99 
Aside from the fact that this interpretation of the agency’s 
Substantial Product Hazard Reporting Rule would leave many se-
rious hazards undiscovered and unaddressed, it finds no support 
in the words of the rule.100 We believe that it stems from a tor-
tured reading of the reporting rule that goes back to 2006, when 
the Commission amended the rule to add several factors for firms 
than that for setting a safety standard. These differences, however, are irrele-
vant when it comes to determining whether the CPSC has different authority 
for recalls than for standards in instances of consumer misuse.  
95 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12 (2018). Under the Consumer Product Safety Act, 
firms that distribute products and determine that one of their products con-
tains a defect which could create a substantial product hazard must immedi-
ately inform CPSC of this determination. See also 15 USC § 2064(b)(3) (2012). 
96 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(a) (obligating the reporting of noncompliance, a 
defect, or an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death). 
97 See id. § 1115.12(b) (noting that a “[f]irm must report information indi-
cating that a consumer product which it has distributed in commerce does not 
comply with an applicable consumer product safety standard or ban issued un-
der the CPSA”). 
98 Id. § 1115.12(c).  
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 2064.  
100 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12. 
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to consider when deciding whether to report potentially hazard-
ous products to CPSC.101 The additional factors in the amend-
ment: obviousness of the risk; the adequacy of warnings and in-
structions to mitigate such risk; the role of consumer misuse of 
the product and the foreseeability of such misuse.102 
When the amendment to the reporting rule was added, sev-
eral consumer groups objected on the grounds that it might be 
interpreted as limiting the scope of reports that needed to be sub-
mitted to the agency.103 Not being privy to the thinking of the 
members of the Commission at that time, we pass no judgment 
on any subjective or unspoken motives that led to the amend-
ment. What we can judge, however, is CPSC’s stated rationale as 
set forth in the Federal Register at the time of publication.104 
There is no hint of an intent to narrow the scope of the reporting 
rule.  To the contrary, the Commission stated: 
These revisions are not intended to reduce the number of re-
ports to the Office of Compliance, to reduce or change the types 
of information reported, or to suggest a diminished need to re-
port.105 
Later, the Commission made the same point by arguing 
that the added words merely clarified how the Commission had 
been interpreting its rule for many years: 
The Commission staff already considers the proposed factors in 
making decisions about potential defects .... Thus, the regula-
tion only makes explicit what was already implicit in the Com-
mission’s regulation.106 
101 See Substantial Product Hazard Reports, 71 Fed. Reg. 42028, 42029 
(July 25, 2006) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1115 (2018)). 
102 Id. (noting that the Commission and staff may consider some or all of the 
factors set forth in paragraph (f)(1) in reaching the substantial product hazard 
determination). 
103 Id. at 42029. Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Kids 
in Danger, and U.S. PIRG (Public Interest Research Group) raised this con-
cern. 
104 See id. 
105 Id. at 42029. 
106 Id. at 42030. 
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Accordingly, the most that can be said about this added 
language is that it made no substantive change whatsoever in the 
reporting rule. It merely put in writing that which had been the 
practice for many years and has been and continues to be the 
agency’s practice: to require firms to report where a hazard arises 
from foreseeable consumer misuse.107 Moreover, a plain reading 
of the text of the reporting rule leads to a similar conclusion. As 
amended, section 1115.4 now reads in part: 
In determining whether the risk of injury associated with a 
product is the type of risk which will render the product defec-
tive, the Commission and staff will consider, as appropriate: 
The utility of the product involved; the nature of the risk of 
injury which the product presents; the necessity for the prod-
uct; the population exposed to the product and its risk of injury; 
the obviousness of such risk; the adequacy of warnings and in-
structions to mitigate such risk; the role of consumer misuse of 
the product and the foreseeability of such misuse; the Commis-
sion’s own experience and expertise; the case law interpreting 
Federal and State public health and safety statutes; the case 
law in the area of products liability; and other factors relevant 
to the determination.108 
The import of this language is obvious. When deciding 
whether a company should report a potentially dangerous prod-
uct, the Commission will look at virtually every aspect of the prod-
uct’s risk to determine whether there is a defect, i.e., “a fault, 
flaw, or irregularity that causes weakness, failure, or inadequacy 
in form or function.”109 If anything, the words constitute a check-
list for firms deciding whether to report.110 They serve as remind-
ers, not limiters.111 
107 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(g)(1)(iii) (2018) (the Commission “[w]ill consider 
the ... reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of the product, and the population 
group exposed to the product” when determining if the risk to the consumer is 
substantial). 
108 Id. § 1115.4. 
109 Id. 
110 See Substantial Product Hazard Reports, 71 Fed. Reg. at 42029 (“The 
Commission’s intent in adopting this provision is to give further guidance to 
firms about reporting defects in their products”). 
111 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(g)(1)(iii) (2018) (the Commission “[w]ill consider 
the ... reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of the product, and the population 
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Finally, keeping in mind that the Substantial Product Haz-
ard Reporting Rule is an interpretive rule promulgated by CPSC 
to provide guidance to the public,112 one wonders why the agency 
would limit the instances in which firms otherwise obligated to 
report should not do so. The illogic of such an approach lends cre-
dence to the notion that the agency’s very broad reporting rule 
remains broad.113 If CPSC’s reporting rule has not been narrowed, 
there is no basis for assuming that its recall authority has been 
narrowed either.114 In short, consumer misuse remains as strong 
a basis for CPSC recalls as it does for safety standards.115 
IV. PRODUCT MISUSE AND HAZARD WARNINGS
If one were to let manufacturers define what constitutes 
consumer misuse of their products, it would be easy to identify 
misuse. One would simply look to the instructions regarding 
proper use and any deviation from these instructions would be 
misuse. Fortunately, agencies and the courts have consistently 
rejected this approach because it would encourage manufacturers 
to unreasonably limit appropriate consumer uses of their prod-
ucts.116 As one court put it: “a product is not ‘misused’ merely be-
cause the manufacturer intended that it be used in a different 
manner; the manufacturer must show that the use which caused 
group exposed to the product” when determining if the risk to the consumer is 
substantial). 
112 See id. § 1115.1 (1978). 
113 The Commission’s guidance to the public—repeated time and again—is 
when in doubt, report. See, e.g., id. § 1115.4 (“[F]irms are urged to report if in 
doubt as to whether a defect could present a substantial product hazard.”). 
114 Manufacturer reporting is a prerequisite to the CPSC exerting its recall 
authority. See generally id. § 1115.2. 
115 See id. § 1115.12(g)(1)(ii). For example, the CPSC has distinctly recog-
nized that the number of products remaining with consumers is a relevant con-
sideration, because a few defective products with little to no likelihood of caus-
ing an injury (even in a minor way) will not typically meet the threshold 
required for a substantial product hazard determination. 
116 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2945 (LexisNexis 2018) (“Misuse 
means ... uses other than those for which the product would be considered suit-
able by a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances”); 
Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (holding 
that deviation from manufacturer-intended use is not necessarily misuse). See 
generally supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text. 
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the injury was not reasonably foreseeable.”117  In short, in the 
product safety context, a manufacturer may not avoid responsi-
bility for making its defective products safe merely because it 
classifies perfectly predictable and completely human behavior as 
misuse and then warns against it.118 Interestingly, even in the 
product liability context, a number of courts have held that liabil-
ity for defective designs cannot be offset by warnings—including 
those determined to be accurate, clear, and unambiguous.119 
There is an equally compelling reason for caution in dele-
gating too much authority to manufacturers to use warnings and 
instructions to decide what constitutes product misuse.120 Study 
after study has confirmed that consumers often do not read and 
heed warnings.121 The reasons for this are many and complex, 
ranging from poorly crafted and placed warnings to consumer re-
sistance to lengthy and unreadable instructions.122 For example: 
117 Magic Chef, 546 S.W.2d at 856. 
118 See id. 
119 See, e.g., Pinchinat v. Graco, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1147, 1150 (M.D. Fla. 
2005) (Court granted summary judgment on failure to warn claim where warn-
ings were “accurate, clear and unambiguous” but remanded for further pro-
ceedings on defective design claim); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 
977 S.W.2d 328, 336 (Tex. 1998) (“[W]hen a safer design can reasonably be 
implemented and risks can reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption 
of the safer design is required over a warning that leaves a significant resid-
uum of such risks.”); see also Ulroh v. Cty. Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 
(Mass. 1978) (“An adequate warning may reduce the likelihood of injury to the 
user of a product in some cases. We decline, however, to adopt any rule which 
permits a manufacturer or designer to discharge its total responsibility to 
workers by simply warning of the dangers of a product.”). 
120 See Eli P. Cox et al., Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior? A 
Meta-Analysis, 16 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 195, 195 (1997). 
121 See id. (citing a review of approximately 400 published articles that con-
cluded “no scientific evidence was found to support the contention that on-prod-
uct warning labels measurably increase the safety of any product .... “). 
122 See, e.g., Susan G. Hadden, Regulating Product Risks Through Consumer 
Information, 47 J. SOC. ISSUES 93, 98 (1991) (discussing problems of highly 
technical and complex warning language); Brad Mehlenbacher et al., On the 
Reading of Product Owner’s Manuals: Perceptions and Product Complexity, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY, 46TH 
ANNUAL MEETING 730, 730 (2002), http://jour-
nals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/154193120204600610 
[https://perma.cc/UG5H-RSRK]) (discussing the negative impacts of important 
warning information being placed in owner’s manuals). 
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• Many consumers fail to read instruction man-
uals of products they believe to be safe or familiar.123 
• Although consumers claim to like safety
training videos, few watch them.124 
• Manufacturers too often place warnings in in-
struction manuals rather than on the products 
themselves, resulting in safety warnings not being 
read.125  
123 See Jennifer J. Argo & Kelley J. Main, Meta-Analyses of the Effectiveness 
of Warning Labels, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 193, 195 (2004) (analyzing the 
effectiveness of warning labels); J. Paul Frantz et al., Potential Problems Asso-
ciated With Overusing Warnings, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HUMAN FACTORS AND 
ERGONOMICS SOCIETY, 43RD ANNUAL MEETING 916 (1999) (looking at the use of 
warnings, particularly the overuse and the negative consequences to including 
them on products); S. Godfrey et al., Warning Messages: Will the consumer 
bother to look?, in HUMAN FACTORS PERSPECTIVES ON WARNINGS 53, 55 (1994) 
(providing studies on how consumers perceive household products and what 
factors cause them to look for warning labels). Hadden, supra note 122, at 97 
(discussing the benefits of information provision for consumer protection, but 
also the downfalls and assumptions it relies on); David W. Stewart & Ingrid 
M. Martin, Intended and Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages: A
Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research, 13 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 1, 6
(1994) (noting that even when consumers are less familiar with a product, they
are more likely to focus on information about product attributes and uses than
warning information); Michael S. Wogalter et al., Consumer Product Warnings:
The Role of Hazard Perception, 22 J. SAFETY RES. 71, 72 (1991) (researching
how a consumer’s perceived danger of a product relates to the willingness to
read warning labels).
124 See Mehlenbacher et al., supra note 122, at 733. 
125 See Argo & Main, supra note 123, at 195; Latin, supra note 22, at 1208–
09; Mehlenbacher et al., supra note 122, at 733; Elizabeth Tebeaux, Safety 
Warnings in Tractor Operation Manuals, 1920–1980: Manuals and Warnings 
Don’t Always Work, 40 J. TECH. WRITING & COMM. 3, 23 (2010) (discussing con-
sequences, specifically the common fatalities resulting from tractor operators’ 
failure to read safety warnings). 
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• Manufacturers too often write warnings or in-
structions in language that is so complex that many 
consumers simply do not understand them.126 Re-
grettably, some risks can be explained only with 
words that are technical, long, or not in common 
use.127 
• Merely because a consumer reads and under-
stands a warning does not mean that the consumer 
will necessarily heed the warning.128 
• Manufacturers too often place a multitude of
warnings on products that overwhelm consumer at-
tention.129 
• Two groups—the poor and elderly—often re-
quire carefully crafted warnings that may be diffi-
cult to develop.130 
• In a “Catch-22”-type syndrome, consumers
will read warnings if they know that a product is po-
tentially dangerous, but they may not know that a 
product is dangerous unless they read the warn-
ings.131 
These and other caveats about the efficacy of warnings and 
instructions remind us that those who rely on them as a safety 
strategy often do so cynically, seeking to avoid liability despite 
knowing that warnings alone do little to protect consumers from 
unreasonable harm. They also realize that other approaches, such 
126 See Hadden, supra note 122, at 98. 
127 See id.; David R. Lenorovitz et al., Mitigating Product Hazards via User 
Warnings Alone: When/Why ‘Warnings-Only’ Approaches Are Likely to Fail, 24 
HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS MFG. & SERV. INDUS. 275, 295 (2012) (criticizing 
the sole use of inadequate product warnings on vehicles with known hazards). 
128 See, e.g., Christopher M. Heaps & Tracy B. Henley, Language Matters: 
Wording Considerations in Hazard perception and Warning Comprehension, 
133 J. PSYCHOL. 341, 350 (May 1999) (testing the efficacy of warning labels on 
household cleaners); Stewart & Martin, supra note 123, at 10–13; A.G. Vreden-
burgh & J. Helmick-Rich, Extrinsic Nonwarning Factors, in HANDBOOK OF 
WARNINGS 373, 380 (Michael S. Wogalter ed., 2006). 
129 See Frantz, supra note 123, at 917. 
130 See Argo & Main, supra note 123, at 195; Hadden, supra note 122, at 93. 
131 See Hadden, supra note 122, at 97. 
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as product redesign, are almost always more effective. In fact, the 
public health community has long promoted a safety hierarchy 
that prioritizes its approaches to product hazards as follows:  
• Product redesign to eliminate the hazard.132 
• Shielding to place the hazard safely away 
from the consumer.133 
• Last resort: warnings if redesign and shield-
ing are not feasible. 134 
V. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRODUCT MISUSE 
Although our focus has been on the United States, we feel 
it useful to broaden the discussion at this point to demonstrate 
the similarity of treatment of product misuse issues by the inter-
national community. We turn therefore to policy pronouncements 
from ISO, the International Organization for Standardization, an 
independent, non-governmental body of standards bodies head-
quartered in Geneva, Switzerland.135 ISO is the world’s largest 
developer of voluntary standards, having produced over twenty 
thousand standards covering everything from manufactured 
products to food safety, agriculture, and health care.136 
In 2014, ISO issued a set of Safety Guidelines for ISO 
standards.137 What is particularly compelling about ISO’s guide-
lines is their insistence that safety standards address reasonably 
foreseeable misuse. The Guidelines do this by describing how pro-
ducers and others should achieve what the Guidelines describe as 
                                                 
132 See Marc Green, Safety Hierarchy: Design versus Warnings, (2000), 
http://www.visualexpert.com/Resources/safetyhierarchy.html 
[https://perma.cc/CU7X-F32L].  
133 See id. 
134 See id.; see also Lenorovitz et al., supra note 127, at 277; Michael S. 
Wogalter & Kenneth R. Laughery, WARNING! Sign and Label Effectiveness, 5 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 33, 36 (1996). 
135 See About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, 
https://www.iso.org/about-us.html [http://perma.cc/3MNZ-GERP]. ISO was 
founded in 1926 as the International Federation of National Standardizing As-
sociations. After World War II, in a coordinated move with the United Nations, 
it was reinstituted as ISO. Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See ISO Safety Guidelines, supra note 19. 
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“tolerable risk.”138 Below is an excerpt from the Guidelines’ de-
scription of the necessary considerations in achieving tolerable 
risk. 
6.2 Tolerable Risk 
6.2.1 All products and systems include hazards and, therefore, 
some level of residual risk. However, the risk should be reduced 
to a tolerable level .... 
6.2.3 Drafters of standards shall consider safety aspects for the 
intended use and the reasonably foreseeable misuse of prod-
ucts and systems, and apply risk reduction measures to achieve 
a tolerable risk level. 
6.2.4 Drafters of standards shall also consider reasonably fore-
seeable uses of the product which, even if they are not intended 
uses are readily predictable based on the collective experience 
of the end user population. In particular, when determining the 
risk posed by consumer products, consideration should be given 
for products that are intended for, or are used by, vulnerable 
consumers139 who are often unable to understand the hazard 
or the associated risk. 
6.2.5 To many suppliers, it might seem that the end user does 
not use the product for its intended purpose or in the manner 
intended. However, predictable, known human behavior 
should be considered in the design process.140 
In short, despite the laments of some naysayers that prod-
uct misuse ought not be the concern of producers, standards writ-
ers, or the government, we believe that an overwhelming interna-
tional consensus exists that enlightened policymakers need to 
protect end users from harm arising from foreseeable product 
misuse.  
138 Id. at 2 (defining tolerable risk as the “level of risk that is accepted in a 
given context based on the current values of society”). 
139 ISO’s Guidelines define a “vulnerable consumer” as one who is “at 
greater risk of harm from products or systems due to age, level of literacy, 
physical or mental condition of limitations, or inability to access product safety 
information.” Id. 
140 Id. at 5–6. 
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CONCLUSION 
There have been too many instances in which consumers, 
especially parents, have come before CPSC to urge the agency to 
take regulatory action against hazardous products that have 
harmed their families even though a finger of blame might be 
pointed at them for their carelessness or negligence.141 A number 
of these individuals have confessed that they previously had been 
dismissive of what they referred to as “those stupid consum-
ers.”142 Yet, when tragedy hits, they suddenly see the wisdom of 
protecting even those who did not precisely follow the manufac-
turer’s instructions or whose attention momentarily strayed—es-
pecially when removing the hazard by redesigning the product 
would be extremely cost-effective. 
To pick one poignant example, in 1992, the Commission 
was petitioned to regulate baby walkers, the cause of numerous 
serious injuries and deaths that occurred when infants tumbled 
141 See, e.g., Complaint at 6, In re Britax Child Safety Inc., Docket No. 18-1 
(Consumer Product Safety Commission 2018), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-pub-
lic/pdfs/recall/lawsuits/abc/2018-02-16-Complaint-In-re-Britax-Child-Safety-
Inc.pdf?mQufi7GrG7MFQLoRkVvn8oH8e5cyCsDe [http://perma.cc/7M48-
5HER] (describing injuries to children as part of initial filing in CPSC adjudi-
cative proceeding against stroller manufacturer); In re Maxfield & Oberton 
Holdings, LLC, Compl. at 5–6, CPSC Docket 12-1 (2012), 
https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-public/pdfs/lawsuit_maxfield1a.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/QW3G-PKZE] (describing injuries to children as part of initial 
filing in CPSC adjudicative proceeding against magnet toy manufacturer); Re-
port #20180816-49B63-2147386132, SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV (2018), 
https://www.saferproducts.gov/ViewIncident/1784824 [http://perma.cc/N4WP-
T5QW] (report from parent whose child was injured by a malfunctioning 
stroller); Report #20120906-5E592-1270611, SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV (2012), 
https://www.saferproducts.gov/ViewIncident/1270611 [http://perma.cc/VU9G-
AKND] (report from parent whose child was injured by a malfunctioning crib). 
142 See Elaine Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 77 (1966) (presenting the classic study 
showing that the worse the consequences of an accidental occurrence, the 
greater the tendency of others to assign responsibility to the accident victim 
and explicating the defensive attribution theory). See also Neal Feigenson et 
al., Effect of Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Respon-
sibility and Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 597, 612 (1997) (noting that bystanders not only blame the victim, but 
often try to distance themselves from the victim in effort to preserve their belief 
that they will not find themselves in a similar situation). 
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down stairs while using baby walkers.143 At that time, one Com-
missioner condemned her colleagues for voting to undertake rule-
making, arguing that irresponsible caregivers, not defective walk-
ers, constituted the hazard.144 Accordingly, she insisted that the 
only fix should be educating parents about the need to install 
gates at the top of stairs: “Babies who fall down stairs—in and out 
of walkers—are victims of the same hazard—unprotected stairs. 
THE SIMPLE ACT OF CLOSING A DOOR OR INSTALLING 
AND USING A GATE COULD ELIMINATE OVER 40,000 
ACCIDENTS PER YEAR. Baby walkers do not present a mechan-
ical hazard.”145  
To us, the irresponsible party was the dissenting Commis-
sioner, who was prepared to consign tens of thousands of innocent 
children to broken bones, shattered skulls, or even death simply 
because she felt that caregivers did not live up to her notion of 
responsible behavior. What makes her position so frustrating and 
unacceptable is that once the Commission turned its attention to 
the problem, manufacturers quickly developed a simple yet ele-
gant solution: attaching plastic “skids” on the bottom of the walk-
ers’ frames that acted as a brake when a wheel went off a step.146 
This inexpensive fix prevented the walker from tumbling down 
the stairs, virtually eliminating the hazard.147 
We have seen numerous other situations in which objec-
tions have been raised to effective safety solutions, simply be-
cause consumers acted in perfectly human and predictable ways 
that could be classified as careless, even though safety solutions 
                                                 
143Baby Walkers; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for 
Comments and Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 39306, 39307 (Aug. 2, 1994). 
144 See Statement of Commissioner Mary Sheila Gall on Proposed Govern-
ment Regulation of Baby Walkers (June 30, 1994). 
145 Id. 





[http://perma.cc/U4N5-H4EB] (example of baby walker with brakes). 
147 See id. 
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existed that were non-intrusive and inexpensive.148 The typical 
response is to offer warnings to consumers and then criticize and 
abandon them when they (predictably) do not follow the warn-
ings—an approach we refer to as “warn and scorn.”149 
We hope for and expect a more humane response from pol-
icymakers at health and safety agencies. Blaming consumers who 
used a product and were injured or killed as a result, simply be-
cause their reasonably foreseeable use was somehow at odds with 
the use intended by the producer or designer, is not just inhu-
mane and reprehensible. It is truly bad public policy particularly 
when it is the basis to justify regulatory inaction. Using foreseea-
ble consumer  behavior—victim-blaming—to undercut regulatory 
goals is unacceptable. It deviates from the clear congressional 
mandate at CPSC and turns fundamental notions of accountabil-
ity upside down.150 A legal culture that scapegoats consumers is 
little more than a grotesque symptom of pathological regulatory 
capture.151 It undermines the deterrent effect of both product 
safety regulation at CPSC and the broader deterrent effect of tort 
liability in the civil justice system.152 Seen in that light, a ramped 
up consumer misuse standard rewards those who create risks and 
punishes those who are harmed.153 That cannot possibly be the 
148 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S8452 (daily ed. July 31, 2001) (statement of 
Sen. Biden) (describing an instance of Commissioner Gall opposing simple fire 
safety solutions). 
149 There is a better way. Scholars such as William Askren, an industrial 
psychologist, have developed extremely helpful tools for assessing and mini-
mizing risks arising from the reasonably foreseeable misuse of products. See 
William B. Askren, Predicting and Evaluating Misuses of Products, 13 
ERGONOMICS IN DESIGN 15, 16–18 (2005), http://jour-
nals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/106480460501300105?journalCode=erga 
[http://perma.cc/CW6S-V7ZK]. 
150 See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text. 
151 See generally Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The 
FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005) (assessing the means by which busi-
ness interests effectively insinuate their perspectives on regulatory action); 
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory 
Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013). 
152 See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text; supra note 25 and accom-
panying text. 
153 See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
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legacy anticipated when CPSC was formed nearly a half-century 
ago.154 
154 The agency was created and first went into operation in 1972. Who We 
Are – What We Do For You, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, 
https://www.cpsc.gov/Safety-Education/Safety-Guides/General-Infor-
mation/Who-We-Are---What-We-Do-for-You [http://perma.cc/7M6X-LJPB]. 
